The automation of the SSL/TLS certificate renewal enables enterprises to cite its importance for online activities. However, the process of traditional DNS-01 validation may cause certain problems associated with constant updating of DNS records, using of provider APIs, and managing credentials.
With the introduction of DNS-PERSIST-01, the principles of operation are different as the domain owners are allowed to use just the persistent DNS TXT record as the proof of authorization of the particular CA and ACME account instead of generating a new DNS challenge record each time a certificate needs to be validated.
It means that all companies and organizations that deal with renewals of a great deal of certificates, wildcard certificates, private infrastructures and automatic deployment pipelines can now benefit from this process.
However, it should be noted that the use of DNS-PERSIST-01 does not mean that it is a permanent version of DNS-01.
In this article, the authors will explain the principle of operation of DNS-PERSIST-01 and the differences between this method and traditional DNS-01, show people how to configure it, and discuss the security issues related to the use of the service in the real life.
What Is DNS-PERSIST-01?
DNS-PERSIST-01 is a validation method in which a Certificate Authority conducts domain control validation via a permanent DNS TXT record.
The Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) is used as a protocol for certificate generation automation.
Whereas the classic DNS-01 validation method uses a client that publishes a TXT record for a particular challenge, DNS-PERSIST-01 is based on the use of a permanent rate-specific authorization record, which is tied to a particular ACME account.
This record is published under the _validation-persist DNS label.
For instance:
_validation-persist.example.com. IN TXT (
“letsencrypt.org;”
” accounturi=<CA-specific-account-hash>”
)
This sample format is not to be taken as a ready-to-use record. The variable accounturi should comply with the established requirements of the CA and the respective protocol specification version.
The existing draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist-02 contains the protocol draft of the current version of the record and uses the hashed account URI in order to tie the authorization to an account key to an authorization. More outdated versions might unapologetically apply a not quite compatible format.
Why Was DNS-PERSIST-01 Introduced?
For a long time, DNS-01 has been a useful and commonly applied validation method in the issuance of wildcard certificates or in the protection of infrastructure that cannot support HTTP-based validation challenges.
One of the problems with using traditional DNS–01 is that it generates repetitive operational tasks.
1. Recurrence of DNS updates
Whenever a validation needs to take place, a new challenge value must be published in DNS. The automation system must create, wait for, and eventually delete the record when it is no longer needed.
2. Automation & DNS API credentials
Many DNS-01 technologies need API access to the authoritative DNS service provider. These credentials can be scattered across different servers, containers, CI/CD pipelines, and renewal jobs.
3. Propagation times
The issuance of certificates can be delayed because of the time needed for the CA to verify the existence of the challenge record. Caching, behavior of the provider, and mistakes made in record configurations can complicate the troubleshooting process.
4. Issues of concurrent validation
If there are several certificate requests using the same DNS name, this can cause problems with badly designed automation in the event of overwriting or premature deletions of challenge records in scripts.
5. Enterprise change-management requirements
Several corporations limit the ability to modify DNS entries by blocking them. Forcing the organization to change its DNS entries each time it needs to renew its TLS certificates can create problems in the firm’s relationship with DNS administrators, as they will need to wait for the modification.
The solution to this issue is provided by DNS-PERSIST-01 since it separates the process of domain validation from that of issuing certificates.
The balloting SC-088v3 has been accepted by the CA/Browser Forum, which means that now the requirement of having persistent DNS TXT validation is added to the TLS Baseline Requirements. It should be noted that IETF is now working on creating ACME challenge specification.
Also Read: Compare ACME validation: HTTP-01, DNS-01, TLS-ALPN-01, DNS-PERSIST-01
How does DNS-PERSIST-01 Operate?
DNS-PERSIST-01 enables domain owners to create a permanent DNS TXT record that permits a specific Certification Authority (CA) and an ACME account to verify domain control.
DNS-PERSIST-01 differs from normal DNS-01 validation in that the new and challenge-related TXT record need not be produced or published. Rather, it only employs a record under the _validation-persist DNS label that can be applied for future certificate requests until the authorization lasts.
The record comprises the CA issuer domain and an account value linking it to the certain ACME account.
In accordance with the configuration, some additional parameters such as policy=wildcard can imply that a certificate is valid for wildcard certificates as well, while persistUntil can indicate an expiry date.Once the record is published and recognized by a suitable CA, the dioxide authority can be used repeatedly without making constant changes to DNS. However, the CA still has to abide by its validation policies and to check account statuses and limit usage of validation data.
What Issues Will DNS-PERSIST-01 Address?
DNS-PERSIST-01 allows one to solve a number of operational challenges related to certificate operation.
| Problem | Traditional DNS-01 | DNS-PERSIST-01 |
| DNS updates during renewal | Usually required for each new challenge | Can be avoided after authorization is established |
| DNS API access | Often needed by renewal automation | May be limited to initial setup and later record management |
| Propagation delays | Possible during each challenge | No new challenge-record propagation delay during ordinary reuse |
| Concurrent renewals | Requires careful challenge-record coordination | Avoids repeated challenge-token updates for persistent authorization |
| Wildcard certificates | Supported | Supported under the applicable persistent-authorization scope rules |
| Authorization lifecycle | Fresh challenge evidence | Persistent authorization with CA-defined validity |
| Security priorities | Protect DNS write access and challenge automation | Protect DNS authorization records and ACME account credentials |
DNS-PERSIST-01 Explained for Beginners
Picture the scenario where the organization administers about 200 websites and is keen on certifying their domains on autopilot.
With normal DNS-01, they would sometimes have to publish temporary proof in the DNS, while their systems were taking care of automated certification.
The new process of DNS-PERSIST-01 changes the game.
This involves not sending regular proof of controlling the domain through the new DNS challenge.
Instead of this, the organization issues a long-lasting authorization record that identifies its authorized certificate issuer and ACME account.
In this case, the CA will be able to refer to the record when verifying the following requests for certification.
You can think about DNS-01 versus DNS-PERSIST-01 like this:
- DNS-01: Keep providing new proof every time a new challenge comes.
- DNS-PERSIST-01: Create a permanent authorization valid under certain conditions.
This is not an unlimited consent to issue certificates. The CA has to check the account state, scope of authorization, requirements for the certification, and other policies applicable in general.
The owner of the domain also has to remove unnecessary authorizations and act in case of compromises of an account or of DNS records.
DNS-PERSIST-01 vs Traditional DNS Validation
| Feature | Traditional DNS-01 | DNS-PERSIST-01 |
| Validation method | Uses a fresh challenge-specific DNS TXT record for each validation. | Uses a persistent DNS TXT record to authorize a specific CA and ACME account. |
| DNS record | _acme-challenge | _validation-persist |
| DNS updates | Generally required for every new challenge. | Usually required only during initial setup and subsequent authorization changes. |
| Renewal process | Publishes a new challenge value, validates it, and cleans it up as appropriate. | Reuses existing persistent authorization while it remains valid and acceptable to the CA. |
| DNS propagation | May introduce delays during each validation. | Avoids repeated challenge-record propagation delays during ordinary authorization reuse. |
| DNS API credentials | Often required by automated renewal pipelines. | May be restricted to initial setup and authorized record-management operations. |
| Concurrent validation | Requires careful handling of multiple challenge records to avoid conflicts. | Reduces conflicts caused by repeatedly updating challenge-specific records. |
| Account binding | Uses challenge-response validation associated with the ACME authorization process. | Explicitly binds persistent authorization to a particular CA and ACME account. |
| Wildcard certificates | Supported. | Supported when the applicable authorization scope and CA implementation permit it. |
| Authorization expiration | Governed by challenge and CA authorization rules. | Can use persistUntil, alongside applicable CA authorization and reuse policies. |
| Security risks | Exposed DNS credentials or challenge automation can be abused. | Persistent authorizations and compromised ACME account keys can create longer-lived risks. |
| Revocation and invalidation | Stop creating new challenges or remove relevant records as appropriate. | Remove or replace persistent authorization records; deactivate a compromised ACME account when necessary. |
| Best suited for | Existing certificate automation and environments requiring fresh challenge validation. | Large certificate estates and environments where recurring DNS updates create significant operational overhead. |
How to Set Up a DNS-PERSIST-01 TXT Record for ACME Configurations
To set up a DNS-PERSIST-01 TXT record to automate your ACME certificates, follow these instructions.
Step 1: Check that your Certificate Authority and ACME Client are Compatible
Before you set up DNS, ensure that your Certificate Authority (CA) supports DNS-PERSIST-01 and that your ACME client uses the correct version of the protocol. Review the documentation from the CA for supported challenge types and the release notes for the client. Do not assume that any client that supports DNS-01 will automatically support DNS-PERSIST-01.
Step 2: Create or Choose Your ACME Account
Create your ACME account with your chosen CA or use an existing account to issue your certificate. Keep the private key safe and take note of the domains and certificates that depend on this account because persistent authorization is tied to this account.
Step 3: Generate the Persistent Authorization Value
Follow the CA’s implementation instructions to find the issuer-domain name and generate your accounturi. The accounturi value in the current IETF draft is a hashed URI. Do not invent your own account ID or use an old example that has a raw account URL.
Step 4: Create the DNS TXT Record
Log in to your DNS provider’s dashboard and create a TXT record using the following illustrative structure:
_validation-persist.example.com. IN TXT (
“authority.example;”
” accounturi=<CA-generated-account-hash>”
)
Substitute example.com with your domain name along with the specific issuer domain name and the account binding value generated from your CA’s own specification. Please be informed that the values in the above example are only examples and not an actual configuration.
Step 5: Configure Optional Authorization Parameters
You may use other parameters depending on your needs and the CA’s application of the standard; for example:
- policy=wildcard — enables the wildcard authorization scope defined by the specification.
- persistUntil — sets an optional expiration timestamp represented as a base-10 UNIX timestamp in seconds.
For example, an authorization with an expiration parameter follows this illustrative structure:
_validation-persist.example.com. IN TXT (
“authority.example;”
” accounturi=<CA-generated-account-hash>;”
” persistUntil=<UNIX_TIMESTAMP>”
)
Calculate the timestamp carefully and configure monitoring to alert you before the authorization expires.
Step 6: Verify the DNS TXT Record
After saving the record, query DNS to confirm that it is published correctly:
dig TXT _validation-persist.example.com +short
In case the record cannot be found, one should check the authoritative namesevers. Ensure that the domain name of the issuer, the label, the binding value of the account, and any optional parameters are defined as required.
It is believed that when the DNS lookup finds the record, this indicates that the record is there, but this does not mean that the CA is going to accept the authorization.
Step 7: Configure Your ACME Client
Be cautious when setting the ACME client to use the dns-persist-01 challenge. Use only the version that allows this action. Refer to the instructions provided with the software for guidelines regarding how to select the challenge from the list, configure the account, and complete the authorization process.
There is no single command line operation that could be used with any ACME client or CA. Do not presume that this traditional DNS-01 command with a right challenge flag can be reused in this case.
Step 8: Test Certificate Issuance
Whenever possible, verify the configuration with the staging environment of the CA prior to issuing any certificates or using the production credentials. The verification should confirm the process of certificate issuance, raising the challenge with the technology of persistent authorization used by a CA and confirming that the issuer will accomplish its actions.
Step 9: Configure Monitoring and Maintenance
When the validation plans are successful, keep an eye on the persistent record in order to trace any unwanted changes and deletions. Establish a list of domains, accounts for ACME, expiration dates, and an owner for each entity. Test your account key’s switching on and emergency actions’ performance, and verify the validity period of the certificate without the persistent authorization.
How to Configure DNS-PERSIST-01 for Wildcard Certificates
To set up DNS-PERSIST-01 for wildcard SSL certificates that can secure multiple subdomains for example.com, please go through the following steps.
Step 1: Check for Wildcard Enablement
You need to check that both your Certificate Authority (CA) and your ACME client are capable of using the DNS-PERSIST-01 wildcard authorization method. You should keep in mind that although the conventional DNS-01 does support wildcard certificates, persistent validation is geared toward compatible CA and customer implementations only.
Step 2: Create/Use ACME Account
You can create an ACME account with your CA or choose an already existing one and protect its private key, since the persistent validation involves that account.
Step 3: Generate an Account Binding Value
You need to generate an accounturi value as specified by your CA’s DNS-PERSIST-01 standard.
Step 4: Publish Persistent TXT Record
Create a TXT record under _validation-persist in the authoritative DNS zone of your domain.
For example:
_validation-persist.example.com. IN TXT (
“authority.example;”
” accounturi=<CA-generated-account-hash>;”
” policy=wildcard”
)
As an illustration, change the authority.example and placeholder account hash to the CA’s actual values.
Step 5: Verify DNS Record
Use the command below to determine if the TXT record has been published:
dig TXT _validation-persist.example.com +short
Make sure that the record shows the correct issuer-domain name and account-binding value, along with the parameter policy=wildcard.
Step 6: Set Up Your ACME Client
Install a compatible ACME client to obtain the required wildcard certificate employing DNS-PERSIST-01. Be guided by the CA relevant to the challenges selection and the authorization scope; options may differ from one version of the clients to another.
For instance, certificate request may include:
- example.com
- *.example.com
A wildcard certificate implies multiple first-level subdomains such as www.example.com and api.example.com, but it does not include deeper subdomains like dev.api.example.com. The specifics about the authorization scope are defined by the specification and implementation of the CA.
Step 7: Test Wildcard Certificate Issuance
If you are able to, make use of the staging platform provided by your CA. Confirm that the right approvals are in place and that the obtained certificate features the targeted domain names in its Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field.
Step 8: Secure and Monitor the Authorization
Limit access to the accounts and DNS zone linked to the ACME and keep track of how the validation-persist records evolve over time to ensure that there is nothing out of the ordinary about the application of the Wildcard authorization. Should the authorization get into the wrong hands, it is crucial to act according to the emergency account deactivation steps set forth by the CA and to check if any certificates were obtained while it was compromised.
DNS-PERSIST-01 persistUntil Explained
The persistUntil function in DNS-PERSIST-01 allows domain owners to define a time limit after which persistent DNS authorization will no longer be valid.
It also controls how long a CA will be able to use this authorization for new certificate verification and helps organizations structure long-lasting permissions and mitigate the risk of forgotten DNS records that may exist indefinitely.
This value must be a decimal UNIX timestamp indicating the number of seconds from January 1, 1970, UTC time. For example:
_validation-persist.example.com. IN TXT (
“authority.example;”
” accounturi=<CA-generated-account-hash>;”
” persistUntil=1798761600″
)
This example illustrates that 1798761600 has a set meaning for UTC date and time and before you use your expiration, you need to get the timestamp for it. The CA is not allowed to use that validation for new issuance after persistUntil expires.
While authorization expiration does not lead to automatic revoking or invalidation of existing certificates, organizations should keep track of expiration, set prior notification, and renew authorization beforehand.
Despite the fact that persistUntil adds more control over authorizations, it requires additional maintenance, thus the choice of the expiration policy should be based on reaching the right balance between security and operational reliability.
Also Read: Setting Up SSL Auto-Renewal with Different ACME Clients: Step-by-Step Guide
DNS-PERSIST-01 Security Risks and Best Practices
The security approach of taking help of DNS validation is changed due to the introduction of DNS-PERSIST-01. Even if fewer DNS updates are required, persistent permissions need to be secured.
1. Protect the ACME account key
The account key is among the main security assets. If anyone manages to compromise the account, they may exploit the persistent permissions to take certificates even if they does not have DNS writing credentials.
Use the proper way of storing the key, apply limiting file access permissions, allow limited access and make the process of dealing with incidents clear.
2. Restrict DNS permissions
Only authorized personnel should be allowed to make changes in persistent authorization records.
The best way is to apply limited DNS API permissions instead of the credentials that allow changing any records in one zone.
3. Monitor authorization records
Be aware of any unexpected creation, modification or deletion of _validation-persist records.
Create and maintain the inventory of records where each record is associated with its domain owner, CA, ACME account, expiration policy and business purpose.
4. Review wildcard scope
Long-term permission for wildcard authorization should be limited whenever possible.
To avoid damaging implications in the event of an account being hacked, apply individual ACME accounts and limit access.
5. Plan for key rotation
Don’t presume that an account and key change can’t go wrong.
According to the conceptual paper, the hashed account URI contains the account key.
The established retention policy of the issuing CA might let the expired bindings still be in effect; however, one has to ensure proper action from the client’s and CA’s sides in order for the process to go smoothly.
6. Prepare for account compromise
If an account from ACME is breached:
- Deactivate the account through a method approved by the CA.
- Delete authorization records or wipe them clean.
- Search for any certificates that were released while the account was compromised.
- Cancel the compromised certificates if necessary.
- Create new authorization through an authorized account and make changes to DNS using the trusted account.
Only changing the DNS record does not invalidate already established authorization.
7. Use DNSSEC appropriately
This technology may provide a way to confirm the authenticity of DNS data and offer protection from some types of DNS manipulation; however, DNSSEC does not protect against the compromised DNS account, stolen ACME key, or incorrectly authorized record.
Make sure to use DNSSEC together with applying least privilege principle, account key protection, logging, and certificate monitoring.
DNS-PERSIST-01 Validation Failed: Causes and Fixes
DNS-PERSIST-01 validation failure may be the result of invalid TXT records, unacceptable accounturi values, expired persistUntil timestamps, unsupported ACME client, or complications with DNS propagation.
| Cause | Fix |
| Incorrect TXT record name | Verify the _validation-persist label. |
| Invalid account binding | Regenerate the accounturi using the CA’s supported specification. |
| Expired authorization | Update the persistUntil timestamp before expiration. |
| DNS propagation issues | Check authoritative nameservers using dig. |
| Unsupported ACME client | Upgrade to a compatible version. |
| Wildcard validation failure | Verify policy=wildcard and CA support. |
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
1. Which Certificate Authorities Support DNS-PERSIST-01?
Support varies based on the implementation and rollout of each CA. It is important to refer to the CA’s official documentation and check that it works with your ACME client before enabling DNS-PERSIST-01 in your production environment.
2. What Will Happen If a DNS-PERSIST-01 Authorization Is Compromised?
The attacker can use the persistent authorization to get the certificates issued. Disable the affected ACME account, delete the DNS records, check the issued certificates, and revoke certificates.
3. What Is the Status of Approval of DNS-PERSIST-01 Draft by IETF?
DNS-PERSIST-01 is mentioned in the IETF’s Internet-Draft prepared by the ACME Working Group. However, it is a separate concept from an RFC, even though holders of CA and Browser Forum requirements recognize persistent DNS validation.
4. Is it possible that DNS-PERSIST-01 Can Prevent Making Changes to DNS Records During Renewals?
Yes, DNS-PERSIST-01 is an efficient way of avoiding periodic updates of the DNS records when creating renewals, provided the authorization is still valid. The initial setup, lapse of time, account changes, and incidents still require necessary changes to the DNS records.
5. Why Is DNS-PERSIST-01 Significant in Automated SSL Renewal?
The use of DNS-PERSIST-01 minimizes unnecessary DNS changes, delays in propagation, and dependency on the renewal pipeline. This leads to a more straightforward process for SSL automation for firms running several domains and wildcard certificates and operating significant infrastructures.
6. In What Way DNS-PERSIST-01 Helps in Protecting Domain Validation?
The method connects the permanent DNS authorization with a particular CA and ACME account, which protects authorization from being reused as long as the record is written according to the rules and the credentials of the accounts are kept safe.
7. Is DNS-PERSIST-01 Safer Than DNS-01?
Not automatically. It removes the need to expose DNS credentials on every renewal but adds a longer-lived authorization to protect.